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学术讲座:Standing out from the crowd via corporate social responsibility: Evidence from non-fundamental-driven price pressure

学术讲座:Standing out from the crowd via corporate social responsibility: Evidence from non-fundamental-driven price pressure

讲座题目:Standing out from the crowd via corporate social responsibility: Evidence from non-fundamental-driven price pressure

主讲人:高磊

时间:5月4日12:20-13:20

地点:博学925

主讲人简介:

高磊教授现任职爱荷华州立大学Ivy商学院金融学终身轨助理教授。高磊教授获得北京大学计算机科学理学士学位,密歇根州立大学工业数学硕士学位,乔治亚大学金融学博士学位,曾执教于密西根州立大学,乔治亚大学,孟菲斯大学。高磊教授的研究领域涉及金融市场,微观结构,资产回报预测, 实证公司财务,公司监管,企业文化,文本分析和机器学习等。高磊教授的研究获得多个研究奖项,包括 Principle Financial 教授奖, 爱荷华州立大学Research Bootstrap Grant , Eastern Finance Association Outstanding Paper Award 最佳论文奖 和 爱荷华州立大学基础研究奖,孟菲斯大学科研奖,乔治亚大学Woodruff Award研究奖, Comer Award 奖,乔治亚大学Summer Research Award研究奖等。高磊教授已经在顶级国际学术期刊上发表多篇学术论文,包括金融经济学杂志(JFE), 美国科学院会刊(PNAS),公司财务杂志(JCF),金融季刊,经济与商业杂志,策略管理杂志,统计方法与应用杂志等。高磊教授的研究成果还被顶尖的业界期刊引用转载,比如金融学杂志(JF),会计经济学杂志(JAE)等。最近高磊教授开始研究中国金融问题 (政府监管,证券, 人民币,及机构投资者等),有工作论文并发表了数篇论文。高磊教授还经常在国际会议上向业界领袖,学术专家,和政府官员宣讲自己的研究成果。

ABSTRACT:

Prior literature proposes that firms can use corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to signal their quality to investors and other stakeholders. We formally test this prediction by identifying situations where firms deem it necessary to signal via CSR. Using two independent quasi-natural experiments that impose non-fundamental-driven negative pressure on firms’ stock prices, we find that firms under such adverse circumstances engage more in CSR than otherwise similar firms. These effects are more pronounced among firms with stronger signaling needs (i.e., those facing a more opaque information environment and more intense product market competition) and among firms with better signaling capabilities (i.e., those with fewer financial constraints and higher profitability). Further, we find supporting evidence that signaling via CSR under downward price pressure helps firms attract more socially responsible investors, indicating benefits of such signaling efforts.