学术研究

学术信息

当前位置: 首页 » 学术研究 » 学术信息 »

学术讲座:Target setting and allocative inefficiency in lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks

演讲题目:Target setting and allocative inefficiency in lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks

主讲人:汪勇祥

时间:6月5日下午1:30-3:30

地点:博学925

主讲人简介:

汪勇祥博士2010年毕业于美国哥伦比亚大学商学院金融系,本科硕士分别就读于中国人民大学商学院和财金学院,现为南加州大学Marshall商学院金融学副教授(终身教职),目前研究方向集中于实证公司金融,政治经济学,组织经济学,行为经济学,中国经济等相关研究。他的研究情境包括以下:中国的私有化,企业集团,安全生产,上山下乡运动,中日关系,院士选举,农村土地流转,中国保险业、中国银行业等等。汪教授的文章发表在顶尖经济学,金融学,会计学和管理学期刊,包括Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies,Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Administrative Science Quarterly, 以及 Strategic Management Journal 等杂志。汪教授同时为经济学,金融学,管理学,会计学,社会学,法律,政治学,科学等不同学科的顶尖学术期刊审稿。他的研究获得了美国、英国、澳大利亚,以及中国国家自然基金的资助。他的研究被Wall Street Journal, Business Week, The Economist, New York Times, Science等经济、金融和科学媒体报道。

Abstract:

We study the consequences of month-end lending incentives for Chinese bank managers. Using data from two banks, one state-owned and the other partially privatized, we show a clear month-end increase in lending in the final days of each month, a result of both more loan issuance and higher value per loan. We estimate that end-of-month lending is 140 percent higher in the last 5 days of each month as a result of loan targets, with only a small amount attributable to shifting the timing of loans from the following month. End-of-month loans are 2.1 percentage points (more than 10 percent) more likely to be classified as bad in the years following issuance; a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the incremental loans made in order to hit targets are 15 percent more likely to eventually turn bad. Our work highlights the distortionary effects of target-setting on capital allocation, in a context in which such concerns have risen to particular prominence in recent years.