讲座题目：Trading Away Incentives

讲座时间：2023年4月7日（周五）12：20-13：20

讲座方式：学术午餐会

讲座地址： 博学楼925

主讲人：夏烁，莱比锡大学经济与管理学院助理教授，哈勒经济研究所研究员，鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学金融学博士。研究专长为高管薪酬，公司治理与公司财务。侧重从资本市场，高技术人才流动等角度分析公司治理与公司运营决策。

主讲人学术观点：研究兴趣为高管薪酬，公司治理与公司财务。侧重从资本市场，高技术人力资源等角度分析公司治理与公司运营决策。

讲座简介：Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity grants. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.