7月2日SBF论坛：Structural Investigation of Acquiring Ma

金融学院SBF论坛：

题目：Structural

Investigation of Acquiring Managers'Incentives

in Takeovers

 

演讲人：李荻 博士/助理教授（Georgia State University）

地点：博学楼715

时间： 2013年 7月 2日 （周二）16:00-17:30

 

演讲人简介：李荻，密歇根大学（Ann Arbor）Stephen M. Ross 商学院 金融学 博士，佐治亚州立大学J.

Mack Robinson商学院助理教授，研究领域为并购、公司金融、资产定价、结构性计量方法，已在SSCI国际顶级期刊Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis发表论文。

 

讲座摘要：This research quantifies the

degree of agency conflicts in acquiring firms. By estimating managerial

valuations using a structural method and calculating shareholder valuations

from stock market reactions to takeovers, I find that acquiring managers

overvalue targets by 63% of target capitalization. As a result, acquiring

managers pick targets that provide no synergy gains in 17% of takeovers and

overbid by 13% of target capitalization in the rest. Private benefits sought by

acquiring managers amount to $9 million on average and vary substantially

across firms. Agency problems are more severe for larger bidders that have

greater free cash flows and chase larger targets. However, an independent board

can reduce private benefits and mitigate agency problems for acquiring

firms. 

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